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COMMENTS
to one who in fact does not have good credit. The public that receives
such cards unsolicited need only discard them as it does any other un-
wanted mail. Legislation should not seek to prohibit or penalize unsolicited
mailing, but only seek to compel the issuers to pay for actual damages
and expenses incurred. Suppose a bank sends a card to A. A did not ap-
ply for the card and before it reaches A, it is intercepted by B. B makes
purchases that are subsequently billed to A. A refuses to pay and is sued
by the bank. A would have to hire an attorney and defend the action.
These actual expenses and damages should be paid by the issuer. It is im-
portant to note that A is protected when the card comes unsolicited. In
the hypothetical situation just given, if A had applied for the card, the
contract would come into existence when the issuer dispatched the card.
If it were intercepted, A would be liable under the terms of the contract.
Before any legislation is passed, it should be considered carefully and not
acted upon out of deference to public furor or misunderstanding.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, several observations can be made concerning the Mid-
west Bank Card system. First, the MBC is and shall in the future increas-
ing become a substantial factor in the financing of small loans and small
credit purchase transactions in the midwest. :Second, with these objectives
in mind, it can be said that these goals can be admirably met to the satis-
faction of all the parties concerned, by the proper use of the MBC. Third,
any extreme legislative proposal to curtail the flow and/or use of these
MBC cards will be a severe blow to a very ingenious and potentially valuable
method of financing small credit transactions. However, adequate legisla-
tive safeguards should be introduced to awaken the potential and actual
customers of MBC as to just what obligations they are assuming through
the acceptance of the proffered card.
Victor Savikas and Fred Shandling
GOVERNMENTAL AID TO CHURCH..RELATED COLLEGES-
SIDE-STEPPING THE "WALL OF SEPARATION"
Throughout the past century, proposals and programs involving types
of financial aid to church-related institutions have been a recurring source
of controversy.' This discordance results from the interpretations given
the wording of the first amendment which forbids laws respecting an es-
tablishment of religion.2 The problem that will face the courts will pertain
1 DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 165 (lst ed. 1963).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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to the quantity and the character of aid that can be given to church re-
lated colleges by federal and state government, without violating the es-
tablishment clause. This question is of particular importance, today, be-
cause of the increased demands by all private colleges for governmental
aid to enable them to meet the increased costs of education.
To examine this problem as a constitutional question, it will be necessary
to survey the colonial church-state relations which ultimately led to the
drafting of the first amendment. Following that, the various interpreta-
tions of the first amendment will be analyzed to determine the allowable
extent of governmental relations with religion or religiously affiliated or-
ganizations. Types of governmental aid will be shown both on the federal
and state levels in order to present the probable Supreme Court outlook on
the constitutionality of governmental aid to church related colleges.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Throughout the long and illustrious history of our country, controversy
as to the relative position of the church has been present. In England, during
the late 16th and 17th centuries, the unity of the people was destroyed
because of the religious controversies which arose.3 Many people immi-
grated from England and its established church to seek new horizons of
religious freedom in America. But before too much time had past, the
colonists found themselves establishing churches in their own colonies and
passing laws making their own religion the official religion of their respec-
tive colonies. 4
The Puritan colonists believed very strongly in education and developed
a system of public schools.5 These were sectarian schools in which the
public supported a single established religion. Other colonies also set up
public school systems based upon their colony church.6 Soon, trade and
travel began to spread among the colonies, a common political unity in
defiance of England developed, and slowly the colonies began to discard
their established churches.7 By the time that the United States Constitution
was adopted, religious tolerance was generally accepted by the states. 8
In 1784, some Virginia clergymen sought to extend state support to in-
clude religion. In response, James Madison composed his "Memorial and
Remonstrance" which manifested that any financial support of religion
3 BOLES, BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2nd ed. 1963).
4 See I PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 5-50 (1930).
5 BOLES, op. cit. supra note 3, at 4.
o Id. at 5. See also, 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1879 (1905).
7 Pfeffer, Religion, Education, and the Constitution, 8 LAW. GUILD REV. 387 (1948).
The colonial churches diminished from eight to five between 1776 and 1787.
8 Ibid. See generally, COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902).
COMMENTS
was antithetical to freedom of conscience; he termed any tax support "an
establishment of religion." 9 Those opposed to the established church in
Virginia, led by Madison and Thomas Jefferson, obtained the enactment
of the famous "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty," which put all religious
groups on equal footing in the eyes of the state.10 By the time of the Con-
stitutional Convention, Americans had developed an awareness of the dan-
ger of a union of church and state which undoubtedly led to our concept
of separation of church and state. In an attempt to avert some of the dan-
gers attested to by the past, the first amendment stated:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof. .... 11
To better understand the meaning which the framers intended in the
"religious" portion of the first amendment, the various drafts of the
amendment should be scrutinized. 12 It appears that the intention underly-
ing the drafts is the guarantee of equality of all religions and churches by
keeping the federal government from bringing about an inequality of re-
ligions, and thus preventing an "establishment" of religion. 13 The Supreme
Court, in Engel v. Vitale,'4 decided that the purposes underlying the es-
tablishment clause were that, "a union of government and religion tends
to destroy government and ... degrade religion."' ' The court went on to
say that the Founders felt that religion was too personal, social, and holy to
permit its "unhallowed perversion" by a civil magistrate, 16 and it would be
best for both government and religion to keelp them apart. Jefferson, in his
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, enunciated that religion is be-
9 Rafalko, Federal Aid to Private School Controversy: A Look, 3 DUQUESNE L. REV.
211,213 (1964).
10 FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY 78-82 (1899). See also, COBB,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 74-115.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Also see, The Constitution of the United States; S. Doc. No.
39, 88th CONG., 1st Sess. 846-47 (1964).
12 Six versions in all were proposed: (1) "The civil rights of none shall be abridged
on account of religious belief, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full rights of conscience in any manner or on any pretext be infringed." 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 434 (1789). (2) "No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal
rights of conscience be infringed." Id. at 729. (3) "Congress shall make no laws touch-
ing religion, or infringing the right of conscience." Id. at 731. (4) "Congress shall
make no law establishing religion, or to infringing the rights of conscience." Id. at 73 1.(4) "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise
thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." Id. at 766. The House adopted the
fourth version but the Senate rejected it and adopted its own version which the House
then rejected. Finally, a committee of three from each House of Congress wrote a final
version which is our first amendment.
13 Costanzo, Federal Aid to Education and Religious Liberty, 36 U. DET. L. J. 1.
5 (1958).
14 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 15 Id. at 431. 16 Id. at 432.
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tween man and his God and that man owes account to none other for his
faith; and, he concluded that the establishment clause built a "wall of sep-
aration" between church and state.17
A Senate Committee, in 1853, investigating the constitutionality of
chaplains in the military, gave an authoritative view of the limitations of the
establishment clause.' 8 The committee concluded that laws in favor of any
church or system of religious belief would be invalid if they provided for
endowment at the public expense, or for any particular privileges to its
members. It should be noted that there is no mention in the first amend-
ment, or even in the deliberations of Congress on the first amendment, of
policy or aid in regard to any type of education, religious or nonreli-
gious.19 To examine the constitutionality of governmental aid to church
related colleges, the interpretation underlying the establishment clause will
be discussed.
INTERPRETATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the establishment clause must be
analyzed regardless of any intent which the framers may have in mind. It
is the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution that has given us
our substantive law. The establishment clause was first invoked in Brad-
field v. Roberts, 20 wherein the Court sustained a federal appropriation for
the construction of a public ward for indigent patients at the Providence
Hospital, which was under the control of the Sisters of Charity. The
Court found no conflict between the appropriation and the establishment
clause because of the public function which the hospital performed.
The expenditure of federally controlled funds to religious schools was
first examined by the Supreme Court in 1908.21 It was held that provisions
in certain Indian appropriation acts, prohibiting the use of public funds
for the education of Indians in sectarian schools, did not prevent trust
funds belonging to the Indians, and administered by the federal govern-
ment, from being used for such schools at their request. But perhaps the
best and most influential interpretation of the establishment clause was
stated by Mr. Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing
Twp.,)22
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
17Moehlman, Wall of Separation: The Law and the Facts, 38 A.B.A.J. 281, 284
(1952).
18 S. REP. No. 376, 32nd CoNG., 2d Sess. (1853).
10 PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1959).
20 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
21 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). 22 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions ... Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa.23
The Everson case involved a New Jersey statute which authorized local
school districts to make rules for the transportation of children to and
from school. A local school board, pursuant to the statute, authorized re-
imbursement of money to parents for their children's transportation on
commercial buses to school. Part of this money was paid for transportation
to parochial schools. A suit was brought challenging the constitutionality
of reimbursement to parents of parochial school students. The Supreme
Court held that the first amendment does :ot prohibit this reimbursement
because it is a part of a general program in which the fares of students at-
tending all schools are paid. It was pointed out that the first amendment
requires the state to be neutral in its relation with groups of religious be-
lievers and nonbelievers and not to be an adversary of religion. The statute
was sustained as public welfare legislation, for the benefit and safety of
children, and was not considered an establishment of religion.
In McCollum v. Board of Education,24 the releasing of public school
children from classes for religious education by outside teachers within the
public school building was held to have breached the wall of separation.
However, the problem of releasing students for religious instruction came
up again in Zorach v. Clausen,25 and there the Supreme Court held that a
New York statute providing for the release of public school pupils from
classes to attend religious classes was cons;titutional. In this case, unlike
McCollum, the students were released from classes and sent to religious
centers while the remaining students stayed in their public school class-
rooms. The court decided that this "released time" program is not a
law respecting the establishment of religion. The majority concluded that
the separation of church and state and not the individual preferences of
the Supreme Court Justices is the constitutional standard to be applied in
determining where secular ends and sectarian begins in education, and the
"problem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree. '2 6
The Supreme Court employed the theory of a valid secular purpose in
McGowan v. Maryland,27 by sustaining a statute making Sunday a day of
rest. This decision was based upon the ground that, although the statute
originally had a religious purpose, the present secular purpose of provid-
23 Id. at 15-16.
24 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
25 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 26 Id. at 314. 27 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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ing a day of rest in the interest of health justified the incidental benefit of
religious activity.
The famous Pennsylvania school prayer case of School District of
Abington Twp. v. Schempp,28 was decided in 1963 when Schempp
brought a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state statute requiring Bible read-
ing at the opening of each school day. The Supreme Court looked at the
purposes and the primary effect of the statute to see if there was an estab-
lishment of religion. If the statute has a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion then the estab-
lishment clause is not breached. The Court held that the Bible reading was
prohibited by the establishment clause. Mr. Justice Douglas in his con-
curring opinion expressed the view that the financing of a church in its
religious or related activities with public funds may not be accomplished
without violating the first amendment: "It is not the amount of public
funds expended; as this case illustrates, it is the use to which public funds
are put that is controlling. ' 29
In the circles of legal thinking, two schools of thought have emerged
with respect to the interpretation of the establishment clause. One line
maintains that Madison and others responsible for the wording of the first
amendment desired to erect an insurmountable wall of separation between
church and state.8 0 Followers of this doctrine would be opposed to any
form of single or multiple establishment and to all forms of governmental
aid. The other main school of thought holds that the men responsible for
the first amendment did not expect the state to be wholly neutral in mat-
ters of religion, and that the amendment was enacted to prevent the estab-
lishment of a single state church and not as an injunction against incidental
aid to all religions.-" One professor of law states that, "the wall of separa-
tion is permeable. . . .Time, place, circumstances and subject matter de-
termine what degree of separation there shall be."'3 2 There also exists inter-
mediate philosophies that would look at the particular grant in question to
see if there are any of the particular dangers that the first amendment is
intended to prevent.
The history of colonial church-state relations, the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the establishment clause, and the legal scholars' views on
separation of church and state, present the necessary background to facili-
tate analyzing the question of whether governmental aid to church related
colleges is constitutional.
28 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 2 9 Id. at 230.
30 See generally, BuTTs, AMERICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION AND EDUCATlON (1950).
See also, Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 22, at 28.
31 See generally, O'NEIL, REIIGION AND EDUCAT1ON UNDER THE CONSTr'UrION (1949).
32 Weclew, Church and State: How Mucb Separation, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 26
(1960).
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AID AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
The recent, large Congressional grants to colleges, including church
related colleges, have caused many to raise the challenge of the first
amendment. During the 1800's, the drive to enact federal financial aid to
education legislation elicited a thousand bills and was the subject of many
committee hearings and long floor debate,:. 33 But Congress was only able
to pass a very few acts of major significance.84 In 1945, Senator Aiken of
Vermont proposed a bill for federal aid to public schools and included an
unprecedented provision which gave equal rights and privileges to private
schools.3 5 There was much opposition to the bill, and it was never passed.
Prior to 1963, the federal government had given assistance to private
primary and secondary school children in just two major federal programs;
the National School Lunch Act of 1946316 and the National Defense Educa-
tion Act of 1958.37 Then in 1963, the Higher Education Facilities Act was
passed,38 which provided for the disbursements of federal funds for aca-
demic facilities to public and private institutions of higher learning, in-
cluding church related colleges.3 9 Two years later, the Higher Education
Act4" and the Elementary and Secondary Education Acts41 were passed.
The Higher Education Act provides funds for library resources, student
assistance, teacher programs and improvement of undergraduate instruc-
tion; and, the grant extends to both public and private schools. 42 It also
contains specific provisions to prohibit its unconstitutional application; it is
stated that none of the grants should be made for any educational pro-
gram, activity, service, equipment or materials to be used for sectarian
instruction or religious worship. 43 By including this provision, it appears
that the drafters of the act attempted to prevent its application from vio-
33 Drinan, op. cit. supra note 1.
34 Costanzo, supra note 13, at 4, 15, 16. Professor Costanzo presents a comprehensive
history of federal aid to education.
35 S. REP. No. 717, 79th CONG., 1st Sess. (1945).
3660 Stat. 230 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-60 (1964). The Act allowed parochial
school children to participate.
37 72 Stat. 1580 (1958), 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-589 (Su]Dp. 1966). The Act authorized low-
interest loans to schools including parochial schools for acquisition of new equipment
for the study of science, mathematics and foreign languages.
38 77 Stat. 363, 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-757 (Supp. 1966).
39 20 U.S.C. S 701, 716 (Supp. 1966).
40 79 Stat. 1219, 20 U.S.C. S§ 1001-1144 (Supp. 1966).
4179 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244, 331-332 (Supp. 1966).
42 20 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1051, 1061, 1071, 1121 (Supp. 1966).
43 20 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1027, 1092, 1129 (Supp. 1966).
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lating the establishment clause. 44 Though this Act has yet to be tested by
the Supreme Court, the question of whether the grant is an establishment
of religion will no doubt be raised some time in the future.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion in the McGowan case,45 indicated
that if the primary purpose (as distinguished from an incidental one) of
the state action is to promote religion, that action would violate the first
amendment; but, if a statute furthers both secular and religious ends, and
the secular purpose could be attained by means which would not further
the promotion of religion, then the statute would be constitutional. 4 By
analogy, it would seem that financial aid to a church related school which
would improve its secular facilities would serve a valid secular purpose, and
the benefit to religion which might accrue would be only incidental. In
the Everson47 decision, the statute authorizing reimbursements for bus
fares was upheld because the law benefited the health and safety of the
children-a legitimate public concern. Is not aid to colleges to help improve
its educational standards, a legitimate public concern? If so, it would seem
that a program which would serve that purpose, even if it was aid to secu-
lar facilities of a sectarian school, would be constitutional. 48 The opinions
of Justices Clark and Brennan in the Pennsylvania school prayer case49
appear to articulate that federal aid to education would be constitutional.
Mr. Justice Clark denounced the test of constitutionality to be "a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion." 50 Mr. Justice Brennan believed that governmental assistance to
religion would become impermissible at a point where legislation employs
the organs of government for essentially religious purposes or uses religious
means to serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice. 51
In addition to the above tests, the Supreme Court may also apply the test
of neutrality in determining the constitutionality of the Higher Education
Act. The "neutrality theory," which maintains that the government should
remain neutral as between religion and nonreligion, would seem to pose no
barrier to the Act, which is directed toward educating the public. 5 2 This
objective is fulfilled through grants to both nondenominational and sec-
tarian schools.
44 See S. REP. No. 146, 89th CoNG., 1st Sess. (1965).
45 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
46 Id. at 466-67. 47 Supra note 22.
48 See generally, HEW, MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION UPON FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION, reprinted 50 GEO. L.J. 349,
365-67 (1961).
49 School District of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
50 Id. at 222. 51 Id. at 294-95.
52 Mr. Justice Clark discusses the Supreme Court theory of "neutrality" in the
Schempp decision, supra note 49, at 222-23.
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It thus appears that federal grants to church related colleges which
would further a secular purpose of the college would be constitutional.
Such a secular purpose could consist of secular buildings, laboratories, text-
books and student aid, as opposed to a sectarian purpose such as church
structures and divinity schools. This secular financial aid would not be an
establishment of religion; and, if there were any benefit to religion, it would
be slight and incidental. Also, such grants would enable the student to re-
ceive an improved quality of education-a legitimate public concern. To
date, the Supreme Court has not decided directly the constitutional ques-
tion of federal aid to church related colleges. The constitutionality of such
grants will have to be decided on a case by case basis to determine whether
the federal aid in question violates the establishment clause of the first
amendment.
AID AT THE STATE LEVEL
Establishment of religion at the state level presents problems similar to
those of the federal government; in particular, are state financial grants to
church related colleges unconstitutional? Prior to the passage of the four-
teenth amendment,53 the states were not subject to the constitutional limi-
tations of the first amendment; and, it was not until 1940 in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,54 that the Supreme Court made the establishment clause of
the first amendment applicable to the states. In order to determine the le-
gality of aid to church related schools, the states must therefore apply their
laws as well as the first amendment. Today, all states, with the possible
exception of Vermont, prescribe, either by statute or state constitution,
that no state financial aid may go to a sectarian school.5 5 Because of these
state provisions, it would seem that the only question confronting the states
is whether or not a school is sectarian.
There have been only a few state court decisions rendered which have
touched upon the issue of financial aid to church related institutions.56 In
one of these cases, a Virginia court held that a statute providing for the
payment of tuition for orphans of war veterans at state approved colleges,
some of which were church related, was violative of a state constitutional
prohibition against appropriation of money to schools which are sec-
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law nor deny ... equal protection of the laws."
54 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
55 Costanzo, supra note 13, at 19.
56 See, Schade v. Allegheny County Instit. Dist., 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956);
64th St. Residences Inc. v. City of New York, 10 Misc. 2d 841, 173 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1958);
Swart v. South Burlington Town School Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514 (1961).
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tarian.5 In another case, a New Hampshire decision upheld a proposed
bill granting state aid to hospitals, including sectarian hospitals, provided
the hospitals had an approved nurses training program, because the training
program served a public purpose, and any resulting benefit to religion
would be incidental. 58
A 1966 decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Horace Mann
League v. Board of Public Works of Maryland59 has attempted to establish
guidelines in the area of governmental aid to secular colleges; and, this case
may have a substantial effect upon future state court decisions as well as
upon the individual sectarian institutions. Four Maryland statutes granting
aid to four separate church related colleges for the construction of secular
facilities were involved in this case, and they were challenged as to their
constitutionality. It was claimed that the grants violated the establishment
of religion clauses of the first amendment. The court handled this question
by determining whether or not the colleges were in fact sectarian. If a col-
lege was found to be sectarian, then the state grant would be a benefit to
the religion, and the grant could no longer be considered incidental to law-
ful general welfare legislation.6" Six standards were set by the court in order
to determine whether a college was sectarian: 1) the stated purpose of the
college; 2) the college personnel; 3) the college's relationship with reli-
gious organizations, e.g. extent of ownership, financial assistance and reli-
gious affiliation of members; 4) the place of religion in the college's pro-
gram; 5) the result of the college program; and 6) the work and image
of the college in the community.61 These standards were applied to the
four colleges in question and by a four to three decision, three of the col-
leges were held to be sectarian and unable to constitutionally receive the
grant, even though the grant was used for secular purposes. 62
One of the colleges involved in this case was Hood College, an inde-
pendent liberal arts college affiliated with a Protestant sect. By applying its
promulgated standards, the court found that the sect contributed only
two and two tenths percent of the college's budget, that there were no sec-
tarian student entrance requirements, and that the sect did not select the
school's textbooks. Based upon these findings, the court held that Hood
College was not sectarian and was thus entitled to receive the state grant
57 Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
58 Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 519, 113 A.2d 114 (1955).
59242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 317 (1966). Justices
Harlan and Stewart were of the opinion that certiorari should have been granted.
60 Id. at 671, 220 A.2d at 65.
61 Id. at 672, 220 A.2d at 65-66.
62 Hood College received the grant. Western Maryland, Notre Dame, and St. Joseph
Colleges were denied the financial aid.
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without violating the establishment clause of the first amendment. 3 West-
ern Maryland College, which characterized itself as religiously oriented,
was another of the colleges to which these standards were applied. The
court found that more than one third of the college's governing board
were ministers of a particular sect, and that forty percent of the college's
student body belonged to this sect. This college was thus found to be sec-
tarian and unable to receive state aid without violating the first amend-
ment.
64
This Maryland decision has set forth the guidelines which other states
might choose to follow. The State of Illinois in its constitution specifically
prohibits the use of public funds to help or sustain any school or college
controlled by any church or sectarian denomination. 65 The Illinois courts
may use the standards applied in the Horace Mann case to determine
whether a school is sectarian and therefore prohibited from receiving aid.
If other states do follow the guidelines set forth in this decision, a large
number of church related colleges would be affected. Certain church re-
lated colleges, if desirous of state financial aid, would have to free them-
selves of much of their religious control, add lay members to the board of
directors, and de-emphasize religion in the curriculum so that they would
not be considered "sectarian" within the purview of the Horace Mann
case.
The holding in the Horace Mann case, in effect, says that a grant to a
college that is determined to be sectarian would be invalid because it
would violate the establishment clause. The court's analysis raises an inter-
esting question; just because a college is considered "sectarian" does that
mean that aid to it will be an establishment of religion?66 Where a state
expressly prohibits aid to a sectarian school, there is a reason to apply the
test set down in the Horace Mann case. However, on the basis of the Su-
preme Court's interpretations of the establishment clause, there seems no
reason for such a test.
Under the establishment clause, the most importantant criterion should be
the purposes for which the financial aid is to be used, and thereafter, the
school's relation with a church should be inquired into only to make sure
that the school is not church dominated. It also seems that if a student can
receive an accredited degree at a church related college which accepts all
63 Supra note 59, at 672-76, 220 A.2d at 66-68.
64 Id. at 676-79, 220 A.2d at 68-70.
65 I. CONST. art. 8, S 3 (1870). See also, Latimer v. Board of Educ. of the City of
Chicago, 394 Il1. 228, 68 N.E.2d 305 (1946).
66 In the Swart case, supra note 56, it was held that the mere fact that public funds are
expended on an institution operated by a religious enterprise does not establish that
the proceeds are used to support the religion proressed by the recipient.
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students and has no mandatory religious instruction, and if the particular
financial grant benefits the secular facilities of the college, then the college
could validly receive this aid as a benefit to the public and not be in viola-
tion of the establishment clause. Justice Hammond's dissent in the Horace
Mann case pointed out that all four of the donee colleges involved, fur-
nished a secular liberal arts education, that no religious doctrines entered
into the teaching of secular subjects, and that there were no religious re-
quirements for admission of any student. Therefore, he believed that the
grants would benefit secular training and were thus constitutional and not
an establishment of religion.67
CONCLUSION
Whenever governmental aid to a church related college can be found to
directly benefit the public, with religion only being benefited incidentally,
the courts will uphold the constitutionality of the grant on the basis of not
being an establishment of religion. However, based upon an argument of
practicality and moral justification, the courts should be liberal in their in-
terpretation of "establishment" and in their findings of a valid secular pur-
pose. This approach is necessary because of the need of our private colleges
for financial aid. Our population is experiencing a rapid growth and there
is an increasing proportion of college age persons attending college. Our
society requires more highly developed skills and people in the professions,
and private schools furnish significant help in higher education. 68 At the
current rate of college building construction, there will be insufficient col-
lege facilities to meet the expected enrollment in 1970.6 To retain a high
standard of education at each college, there should be a size limitation upon
the expansion of state facilities; therefore, private colleges should also be
aided.70 Many private schools cannot afford to expand their facilities with-
out public monies. As a result, all colleges, including church related
schools, will require governmental aid to keep up with the increased en-
rollment and education costs, otherwise the quality and availability of
higher education will no doubt be adversely affected.
Barry Schmarak
67 Supra note 59, at 694-95, 220 A.2d at 78-79.
6 8 See 109 CONG. REc. 18406 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1963).
69 ENCYC. BRITANNICA, BooK OF THE YEAR 305 (1965). 70 Supra note 48, at 380.
TRUTH IN TRIAL-DISCOVERY IN ILLINOIS UNDER
THE NEW SUPREME COURT RULES
The new Illinois Supreme Court Rules which became effective on
January first of this year included a complete revision of the rules of dis-
COMMENTS
covery. 1 The new rules, numbered 201 through 215, have been reorganized
so that the four discovery devices and their related provisions appear in
a more logical order.2 A single general provision, 201, now contains the
rules on the scope of discovery, the attoxney-client privilege, the work-
product exemption, and protective orders. This comment will look at
the development of these rules from the iron curtain policy of the ancient
adversary system to today's open door policy of full and frank pretrial
disclosure, and from this draw some conclusions as to what the Illinois
Supreme Court's objectives are and as to how good a solution they have
achieved.
Litigation at common law was in its purest sense an adversary proceed-
ing. The parties had an absolute right to conceal their evidential resources,
and surprise was a part of ordinary trial strategy. The objective of the
contest was to see that only favorable evidence was presented and all else
remained hidden. Reliance was placed on long involved and complicated
pleadings to narrow the issues before the-trial, and many cases were lost
simply because of defects of form at this pretrial stage. Only in litigation
involving sealed instruments was examination of items in the possession
of the opponent allowed. There, by a device called "profert" the plaintiff
could be required to produce a documen: in court; the defendant could
then demand "oyer" which allowed an inspection of the document. 3
This rule was later extended to cover all instruments "declared on"; but
in controversies other than those arising oat of writings the common law
had no means of discovery, inspection, or examination of items in the
possession of another person, regardless of their importance.
To correct this deficiency equity established an auxiliary jurisdiction
appropriately entitled "discovery." Either party to the action could file a
bill in chancery with a series of interrogatories designed to elicit informa-
tion. To this his adversary had to answer by affidavit, stating the requested
facts if such were within his knowledge, and listing the deeds, writings,
and other things in his custody or power. There were two limitations on
the scope of this permissible inquiry. The: seeker could only acquire in-
formation which would be of assistance in proving his own case; and, the
evidence his adversary was to use was not discoverable. Professor Pomeroy
stated the rule to be:
The fundamental rule on this subject is, that ::he plaintiff's right to a discovery
does not extend to all facts which may be material to the issue, but is confined
1 ILL. SuP. CT. RULES, §§ 201-215; 36 111. 2d 54, adopted Nov. 28, 1966, effective Jan.
1, 1967; hereafter cited as ILL. Sup. CT. R.
2 § 201-scope of discovery; § 202 through § 212-depositions; § 213-interrogatories;
214-discovery of documents and tangible thing; § 215-physical and mental examina-
tions.
3 1 PoMauoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 99 190-200 (3rd ed. 1950).
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to facts which are material to his own title or cause of action; it does not
enable him to pry into the defendant's case, or find out the evidence by which
the case will be supported.4
Obviously the idea of the adversary proceeding as a contest had changed
very little by this first discovery extension. The English courts also recog-
nized the professional privilege, and gave it broad scope. This privilege
was claimed by setting out in the answering affidavit, facts showing that
the requested material (1) was obtained for the purposes of litigation, or
(2) was communicated for the purposes of obtaining professional legal
advice. If the court found the affidavit to be sufficient, discovery was fore-
closed. Not until the adoption of the Federal Judiciary Act of 17895
was there any provision in the United States for pretrial discovery by
taking the statements of parties and witnesses. Provision was made for de-
positions de bene esse (recording testimony of witnesses who might not
be available at trial), dedimus potestatem (discovery necessary to prevent
a failure or delay of justice) and in perpetuam rei memoriam (perpetua-
tion of testimony which might be lost before the litigation was presented).
This Act was applicable to both law and chancery.
There was little further pretrial discovery development for some time
except in a few of the state courts. New York, for example, adopted rules
allowing the parties to litigation to examine each other as witnesses be-
fore or at the trial, either by a deposition or before a judge.6 A refusing
party would have his complaint or answer rejected.
Under the first Illinois Practice Act,7 passed in 1907, discovery practices
remained basically those which obtained at common law. But the Practice
Act of 1933,8 in its section 58, marked a significant break with the old idea
of limiting discovery to that strictly essential for use at trial. The first of
its two paragraphs dealt with the discovery formerly available in equity
by bill for discovery. Though preserving all the relief previously obtain-
able, it did away with the requirement of a separate suit and provided in-
stead that the "same discovery may hereafter be had by motion filed in
the cause wherein the matters sought to be discovered would be used." 9
The second paragraph dealt with discovery not previously available.
Discovery of documents which are or have been in the possession of any other
party to the action may be had, admissions as to any Fact may be requested,
and answers to written interrogations may be required of any other party and
4 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 270 (3rd ed. 1950).
5 1 Stat. 73 (1845).
6 MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1952).
7 I11. Laws 45th Gen. Ass., 1907, at 443.
8 I11. Laws 58th Gen. Ass., 1933, at 784.
9 I11. Laws 58th Gen. Ass., § 58(1) (1933).
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the deposition of any other party or of any person may be taken at such times
and under such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by rules.10
The scope of this provision far transcended that allowed by bills in equity.
The Illinois Supreme Court said in a case questioning whether this section
should be controlled by historical limitations in the absence of a provision
to the contrary:
[T]he General Assembly showed its purpose [was] to broaden substantially
the scope of available discovery. It acted in response to prevailing dissatisfac-
tion with procedural doctrines which had exalted the role of a trial as a battle
of wits and subordinated its function as a means of ascertaining the truth."
Inability to discover that which the opponent intended to use at the
trial had been the most serious deficiency of the early equitable bills of
discovery. But under the 1934 Supreme Court Rules,' 2 discovery was no
longer limited to that which had a bearing on the seeker's case. Produc-
tion could even be had of the evidence which was to be used against him.
Henceforth, "the fullest possible discovery consistent with individual
rights and privileges" 3 was allowed, and unless a positive rule of law for-
bade a particular discovery, it was granted. 14
The experience gained from these early rules, and the lessons learned
from the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 15
passed in 1933, have been incorporated -in two subsequent revisions of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act. The first, in 1956, ended all reference to the
equitable bill of discovery; all discovery was now to be in accordance
with the rules of the Supreme Court.16
These new rules, not only simplified the procedures for the particular
methods of pretrial discovery, but also allowed for a much wider scope
in their use. Discovery now contemplated the acquisition of information
calculated to lead to evidentiary material. The Rules used the phrase "re-
lating to the merits of the matter in litigation."'1 7 The "fishing expeditions"
which have since taken place or been attempted have been the subject of
considerable litigation. The result was a second rewriting of the Supreme
Court Rules on Discovery. The Rules Committee took into account both
the case law as it has developed in the past ten years and the comments of
10 111. Laws 58th Gen. Ass., § 58(2) (1933).
11 Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 I11. 2d 37, 41, 132 N.E.2d 532, 534 (1956).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 259.17-.19 (1935).
13 Shaw v. Weisz, 339 111. App. 630,644,91 N.E.2d 81, 88 (1950).
14 Corboy, Discovery Practice-Documents, Tangible Articles, Real Estate, 1959
U. ILL. L. F. 773, 784 (1959).
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 23-26.
16 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58 (1965).
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.19-4 (1965).
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a concerned bench and bar. Their decision as to what is the proper scope
of discovery is the particular concern of this comment.
The new Supreme Court Rules devote a single section to general dis-
covery provisions, Rule 201.18 Its first paragraph simply lists the four gen-
erally recognized discovery methods: oral or written depositions, inter-
rogatories to parties, discovery of documents or property, and physical
and mental examinations. There is no commandment against duplication,
i.e. seeking by one method what has been obtained through another. In-
stead a sentence was included which provided that duplication "should
be avoided." 19 The Committee, in its comments, noted that there would
be situations where the same information could justifiably be requested
under different types of discovery procedures, but, they also made pointed
reference to the language of paragraph (C) (1) of the same rule, "Preven-
tion of abuse."' 20 This would be a logical point to note the discretion
granted the courts to make protective orders. According to the language
of the new rule:
The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or
witness, make a protective order as justice requires, denying, limiting, condi-
tioning, or regulating discovery to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense,
embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression.2 1
Former Rule 19-5(2) conditioned authority to deny or limit discovery
upon "good cause shown." The substitution of the words "as justice re-
quires" serves to emphasize the fact that though discovery is now to be
extremely liberal, the courts will prevent its use as a dilatory tactic or to
harass the other party.
The single case Stowers v. Carp22 is referred to in the Committee Com-
ments, a case in which "good cause" was found to deny defendant access
to valuable information. In Stowers the plaintiff was six years old. He
had fallen under the rear wheels of a truck traveling at slow speed down
a narrow alley. None of the three persons in the cab of the truck saw
the child before the accident. The truck was stopped by a neighbor who
saw the child lying, severely injured, in the alley. In spite of the importance
of the child's testimony in establishing how the accident did happen, the
court refused to allow his deposition to be taken. The court emphasized
that "it was extremely dubious whether the plaintiff knew the relation-
ship and significance of the facts concerning which he was to be examined
or could accurately describe those facts." But no single test, such as the
18 ILL. SuP. CT. R. 201. 19 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201 (a).
20 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201 (c), Joint Committee Comments.
21 ILL. Sup. CT. R. 201 (c) (1).
22 29 111. App. 2d 52, 172 N.E.2d 370 (1961). 23 Id. at 69, 172 N.E.2d at 378.
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incompetency of the plaintiff to testify at trial, was referred to as con-
trolling their decision. The case thus emphasizes the trial court's power to
tailor discovery to individual cases on an equitable ad hoc basis.
SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
The rules on discovery as they now stand provide a permanent "open
season on facts." The restricted discovery of the common law adversary
contest has been abandoned. The modern trend is towards a search for
the truth based on full disclosure by both parties. In fact paragraph (1)
of the section on Scope of Discovery begins simply: "Full Disclosure Re-
quired." 24 The remainder of the paragraph puts few qualifications on this
command. It reads:
Except as provided in these rules, a party may obtain by discovery full dis-
closure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
disclosure or of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any documents or tangible things, and the
identity and location of persons baving knowledge of relevant facts. The word
"documents," as used in these rules, includes but is not limited to, papers, photo-
graphs, films, recordings, memoranda, books, records, accounts, and communi-
cations.2 5
The exceptions enunciated refer to matters privileged against disclosure at
trial, privileged communications between a client and his attorney, and
the work product of the attorney. They are mentioned specifically in
paragraph 11 of this section.
The italicized phrase "any matter relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action" is the language used in Federal Rule 26.26
Its adoption permits examination into matters themselves inadmissible as
evidence but which may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Discovery of this scope was recently challenged in Monier v. Chamber-
lain,27 as being an unreasonable search and seizure and a violation of due
process under both the state and federal constitutions. The Illinois Su-
24 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201 (b) (1).
25 ILL. SuP. CT. R. 201 (b) (1), (emphasis added). 26 FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
27 31 Ill. 2d 400, 202 N.E.2d 15 (1964). The Illinois Supreme Court ruled at this
time only on the constitutionality of an order entered by the Circuit Court of Marshall
County requiring defendant to produce: 1. All medical reports, hospital records, and
correspondence with the attending doctors concerning plaintiff's physical condition
after the accident; 2. All statements made by plaintiff or members of his family; 3. All
memoranda of such statements; 4. All reports, photographs, and statements obtained
by defendant's agents concerning the accident; 5. All medical reports on the condition
of the plaintiff prior to the accident. Other questions on the validity of the scope of
the order were remanded to the Appellate Court of the Third District for considera-
tion. 66 111. App. 2d 472, 213 N.E.2d 425 (1966). aff'd 35 111. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
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preme Court rejected this contention, stating that the "boundaries of the
area constitutionally protected ... were fixed at the limits of relevance." 28
The court went on to hold that a constitutional issue would arise only
if the documents were not material and pertinent to the issue, or the con-
ditions were unduly burdensome.
The Rules Committee of 1955 had attempted to restrict the scope of
available discovery by using the language "relating to the merits of the
matter in litigation." 29 They stated in the Joint Committee Comments
that while the idea of allowing discovery to go beyond admissible evidence
was laudable in theory, in practice under the Federal Rules it was too
often used to harass and oppress the opposite party. The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, was of another opinion. In People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher30
the plaintiff submitted interrogatories asking for the existence and amount
of any liability insurance the defendant possessed. The court ruled that
the defendant must answer. As their reason for this liberal interpretation
the court said:
They [the new rules on discovery] were adopted as procedural tools to effec-
tuate the prompt and just disposition of litigation, by educating the parties in
advance of the trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses. . .. Thus,
to construe the language of Rule 19-4 [related] 'to the merits of the matter in
litigation' to refer only to isolated legal concepts such as negligence, proxi-
mate cause, and damages, divorced from the realities of litigation, would not
be using this new tool with an understanding of its purpose.8 '
The court went on to point out that the plaintiff would now be appraised
of the full extent of his rights as well as to the identity of his adversary,
and that both sides would now have a sound basis for reaching settlement.
This last point has been one of continuing concern for the courts of this
area, as evidenced by its frequent mention in their printed decisions.
The policy of encouraging early settlements is certainly one of the
strong forces behind liberal discovery. The courts have also sought to
discourage any tactic resulting in unnecessary delay. In Monier, 2 a re-
quest for discovery was attacked for failure to specify the documents
desired. The defendant contended that first interrogatories must be em-
ployed to find what documents defendant held, and then a discovery
order would issue. The court disagreed, ruling that it is sufficient to ask
production of relevant material by groups or categories of similar items.
Such description would be sufficient for the opposite party to know what
is desired, and for the court to rule as to whether the material is exempt
2831111. 2d 400, 402,202 N.E.2d 15, 16-17 (1966).
29 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.19-4 (1965).
30 12 111. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
311d. at 236-37, 145 N.E.2d at 592. 32 35 111. 2d 351, 213 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
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or privileged. The specificity which the defendant sought was no more
than a dilatory tactic.
The phrase "identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts"33 has been retained from the former Rule 19-4.34 But re-
quests in the interrogatories may not be framed in the general language of
the Rule. The interrogating party may not put the burden of determining
what are "relevant facts" on the answering party; he must instead frame
his request in terms of some stated fact. Requesting "the names and ad-
dresses of all persons in the possession of defendant who were occurrence
witnesses" has been held to have sufficient particularity." Interrogatories
such as this are not continuing; but under new Rule 213(e),H at any time
before trial a party can be required to provide: a list of persons having knowl-
edge of relevant facts whose names were not known to him at the time
he answered the other parties' interrogatories.
It is obvious from the above discussion that in all contested discovery
motions the attorney seeking discovery will have the benefit of a strong
policy in favor of allowing the motion. The courts have already ruled
that a person asserting any privilege or exemption has the burden of
proving it; his mere assertion that the matter is privileged will not suf-
fice. 37 The new rules recognize the same privileges which existed under
the prior rules; the section has been reworded to reflect the developments
in the case law over the past decade:
Privilege and Work Product. All matters that are privileged against disclosure
on the trial, including privileged communications between a party or his agent
and the attorney for the party, are privileged against disclosure through any
discovery procedure. Material prepared by or for a party in preparation for
trial is subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories,
mental impressions, or litigation plans or the patty's attorney. 38
The first sentence of the section recognizes the attorney-client privilege.
Its application is basically governed by well developed principles of the
law of evidence.39 But there have been two recent cases defining who has
the status of "agent" in making privileged communications.
In Day v. Illinois Power Co.40 the plaintiff was severely injured by an
33 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201 (b) (1). 34 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.19-4 (1965).
35 Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 111. 2d 37, 132 N.E.2d 532 (1956); "Wit-
nesses" is here used in the primary sense of those who have personal knowledge of the
event, and not in the technical sense of those who) are to be called to testify at the
trial. The latter is expressly protected from discovery by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58
(1965).
36 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213 (e).
37 Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, supra note 11.
38 ILL. SuP. CT. R. 201 (b) (2). 39 See 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 276-292 (1957).
40 50 Ill. App. 2d 52,199 N.E.2d 802 (1964).
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explosion at defendant's power plant. The defendant's employees, under
the direction of the attorney retained by the company, inspected the site
and made their reports directly to him. The Illinois Appellate Court held
that these reports were discoverable. The court agreed that a corporation
could claim the attorney-client privilege; but they went on to say that
the privilege only applies where the person reporting to the attorney "per-
sonifies the corporation,"' 41 i.e. has actual authority to control or take part
in a decision about any action the corporation might take on the advice
of its attorneys. The employees here were only passing on information
to the attorney to enable him to advise those in the corporation who had
the authority. Certainly this ruling leaves little room for the privilege to
apply to communications between a corporation and its "house counsel."
There has also been recent interpretation of the role of an insurance
company as the agent of its insured. In People v. Ryan 42 a contempt cita-
tion arose out of a failure to produce a statement given by the defendant
to her insurance company following an accident in which she was in-
volved.43 When criminal charges were also brought she retained inde-
pendent defense counsel. This attorney asked for and, with the insured's
permission, was given a copy of the statement previously given the in-
surer. The state contended that the attorney-client privilege was waived
when, with the insured's consent, the statement was delivered to her own
attorney for use in another connection. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled
that the statement was given to the insurer as an agent "for the dominant
purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests
of the insured. '44 The statement was thus clothed with the attorney-client
privilege while in the control of the insurer. Nor was the effect of this
rule changed by the fact that no attorney had yet been retained by the
insurance company, since they had a contractual obligation to provide one.
The court went on to conclude that the transmittal of a copy of the
statement to the independent attorney to defend an action arising out of
the same transaction did not constitute disclosure to a person not in the
attorney-client relationship. This general rule as to the status of an in-
surer as an agent for transmittal was reaffirmed by the court in the
Monier45 case, but in that case the statement of the defendant was given
41 Id. at 54, 199 N.E.2d at 804. 4230 1l1. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
43 If a party against whom a pretrial discovery order is made wishes to contest the
validity of the order, he may refuse to obey and in a prosecution for contempt show
in defense that the court had no authority to make the order, and in such a case an
appeal is allowed from the contempt order. Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 111. App. 2d 160, 159
N.E.2d 489 (1959).
44 Supra note 42, at 461, 197 N.E.2d at 17.
45 Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 111. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
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to a company which was the liability insurer for both parties to the acci-
dent. The court ruled that since neither side had yet retained independent
counsel, the insurance company remained an agent for both parties, and
the statement was not within the privilege.
While the status of the attorney-client privilege is fairly well defined,
the exemption from discovery claimed by an attorney for his "work
product"4 6 continues to be a consistent source of litigation. The 'work
product' doctrine had its inception in the United States Supreme Court
case of Hickman v. Taylor,47 where the widow of a seaman killed when
a tug capsized sought production of statements taken by the defense
counsel from witnesses in preparation for litigation of the case. The Court
recognized that in spite of the strong policy favoring liberal discovery,
it was essential that a lawyer be allowed "a certain degree of privacy,
free from unneceessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel."
48
The Court ruled that the statements were exempt from discovery, and
rendered this famous statement of the work product doctrine:
In our opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other rule dealing with discovery con-
templates production under such circumstances. That is not because the subject
matter is privileged or irrelevant, as those concepts are used in the rules. Here
is simply an attempt, without purported necessity and justification, to secure
written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollections prepared or
formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As such,
it falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy under-
lying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most
liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and
mental impressions of an attorney. 4
9
Unfortunately, as is usually the case with decisions stated in such general
terms, this statement has received differing interpretations from the day
it was handed down; decisions have been made in the different circuits and
districts on an ad hoc basis. Courts have seized on dictum in the decision
to the effect that even an attorney's work product is subject to discovery
where production is "essential to the preparation of one's case" 50 to de-
velop the "good cause" exception to the general exemption, and the re-
sult is an inconsistent line of rulings even on items of basic evidentiary
value.51 The Illinois Supreme Court has taken the stand that it is preferable
to narrow the scope of the "work product" doctrine, and render material
encompassed thereby absolutely exempt from discovery, at the same time
46 ILL. Sup. CT. R. 201 (b) (2).
47329 U.S. 495 (1947). 49 Stpra note 47, at 509-10.
48 1d. at 510-11. 50 Supra note 47, at 514.
51 See Kennelly, The Work Product Doctrine in Illinois, 1963 NECLIGENCE LAW
FORUM 129 (1963).
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freeing relevant and material evidentiary matter. Their most recent opinion
on the subject limited "work product" to:
[O]nly those memoranda, reports, or documents which reflect the employment
of the attorney's legal expertise, those which reveal the shaping process by
which the attorney has arranged the available evidence for use in trial as dic-
tated by his training or experience .... 52
The general tenor of the cases decided in the last few years give a preview
of just how restrictive this definition is. To categorize a few of them:
Statement of Adverse Party:
In Stimpert v. Abdnour,5' 3 plaintiff's intestate had lost his life while rid-
ing as a guest passenger in the car driven by the defendant. One week after
the inquest at which the defendant, on the advice of counsel, had declined
to testify, the plaintiff and his attorney went to the high school where the
defendant and young Abdnour had been students. The attorney took a
question and answer statement from the defendant in the presence of a
court reporter; and the defendant's attorney sought discovery of this state-
ment. The court, after reviewing all past Illinois cases on the subject, held
that the statement was not within the work product exemption, concluding
that "as properly understood ... this rule does not protect material and
relevant evidentiary facts from the truth seeking process of discovery.
'5 4
Here the defendant's statement, when properly authenticated, might be
"independently admissible" as an admission by a party opponent and in-
troduced as a part of the plaintiff's case.
The same factual situation arose in Oberkircher v. Chicago Transit Au-
thority.55 But in this case an ingenious defense counsel submitted an affi-
davit to the court stating that he did not intend to use the statement as an
admission, but only to impeach plaintiff if the occasion should arise. The
court held, however, that the "independent admissibility" test could not
be so easily avoided. The problem lay in the fact that where a party's testi-
mony is being impeached by his own prior inconsistent statement, the
statement so offered has a twofold value: not only does it raise doubts as to
the credibility of the party's testimony, but it also is in the nature of af-
firmative testimony for the party offering it.
Statements of Witnesses:
In Day v. Illinois Power Company 6 the court ruled that where one
party had exclusive or superior opportunity to know or ascertain the facts
2 Monier v. Chamberlain, supra note 45, at 359, 221 N.E.2d at 416.
5324 111. 2d 26, 179 N.E.2d 602 (1962).
541 d. at 31, 179 N.E.2d at 605.
55 41 I11. App. 2d 68, 190 N.E.2d 170 (1963). 56 Supra note 40.
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surrounding an event, all reports regarding the event made to his attorney
must be disclosed. Then in Monier v. Chamberlain,57 the plaintiff's attor-
ney sought discovery of "all reports, photographs, and statements" ob-
tained by agents and investigators of the defendant's insurance company.
This unqualified request for the other attorney's investigative file was al-
lowed, even though the statements of noriparty witnesses would almost
certainly not be independently admissible, as required by Stimpert;58 nor did
defendant have exclusive access to the facts with the exception of medical
reports as required by Day. The court referred to the rule in Stimpert,
that material and relevant evidentiary facts were not protected from dis-
covery, and went on to say that: "Discovery before trial presupposes a
range of relevance and materiality which includes not only what is admis-
sible at the trial but also that which leads to what is admissible." 59
The Adversary's Expert:
In City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted Bldg. Corp.,60 an eminent do-
main proceeding, defendant sought discovery of the appraisals made by
plaintiff's experts which had formed the basis of the offer made to him be-
fore trial. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled against him, noting that since
evidence of this previous offer was inadmissible, the expert reports on
which is was based were beyond discovery-a decision which would prob-
ably be followed today under the reasoning of Monier, which requires that
discovery at least lead to admissible evidence. A later case, Kemeny v.
Skorcb,61 held that a medical expert's report was beyond discovery as a
"report made for a party in preparation for trial" 62 and thus was exempt
from discovery by the express words of Rule 19-5 (1).63 Since this part of
the old section on privilege was essentially retained, it is likely that its in-
terpretation will also be retained, and expert reports will remain exempt
from discovery.
CONCLUSION
The goal of Illinois civil practice, according to Section 4 of the amended
Act, is "that controversies may be speedily and finally determined accord-
ing to the substantive rights of the parties."' 4 But how often today is an
adequate settlement forced upon an injured plaintiff who faces a five year
wait in court, but whose creditors are not so patient? And how often is an
57 Supra note 45. 58 Supra note 53.
59 Supra note 45, at 353-54, 221 N.E.2d at 413.
60 11 111. 2d 431, 143 N.E.2d 40 (1957).
61 22 111. App. 2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1959).
62 Id. at 169, 159 N.E.2d at 493.
63 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.19-5(1) (1965).
64 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 4 (1965).
